Corporation Accountability: Achieving Internal Self-Governance through Sustainability Reports by Gioseffi, Sonia
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 13
Issue 2 Spring 2004 Article 6
Corporation Accountability: Achieving Internal
Self-Governance through Sustainability Reports
Sonia Gioseffi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gioseffi, Sonia (2004) "Corporation Accountability: Achieving Internal Self-Governance through Sustainability Reports," Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol13/iss2/6
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: ACHIEVING
INTERNAL SELF-GOVERNANCE THROUGH
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS
Sonia Gioseffit
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 503
I. HISTORY OF CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT... 506
II. PRESSURE AND RESPONSE ......................... 508
A. THE PUBLIC .......................................... 509
1. Consum ers ..................................... 509
2. Investors ....................................... 511
B . N G O s ............................................. 512
C. THE JUDICIARY ....................................... 515
D. THE LEGISLATURE .................................... 521
E. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ................... 521
III. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS ......................... 523
A. COMPANIES WITH SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS .......... 525
B. BENEFICIAL ELEMENTS................................ 526
1. Consumers and Investors ....................... 526
2. Potential Litigation Impact ..................... 527
C. EXTERNAL REVIEW .................................. 528
D . PROBLEMS ........................................... 530
CONCLUSION ................................................ 530
INTRODUCTION
Recent financial scandals, as well as public reaction to social and
environmental impacts of corporate activity, have increased pressure for
corporate accountability. In response to the pressure for socially ac-
countable behavior, consumers have seen a growth of companies that
advertise social responsibility and include socially responsible behavior
in their mission statements.' But regulation is necessary to ensure that
t JD/LLM, Cornell Law School, 2004. BA, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2000.
I The Body Shop and Ben & Jerry's both encompass social and environmental goals in
their mission statements. The Body Shop's mission statement is "[to dedicate our business to
the pursuit of social and environmental change; [t]o creatively balance the financial and human
needs of our stakeholders: employees, customers, franchisees, suppliers and shareholders; [t]o
courageously ensure that our business is ecologically sustainable: meeting the needs of the
present without compromising the future; [t]o meaningfully contribute to local, national and
international communities in which we trade, by adopting a code of conduct which ensures
care, honesty, fairness and respect; [t]o passionately campaign for the protection of the envi-
ronment, human and civil rights, and against animal testing within the cosmetics and toiletries
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conduct matches a company's statements. Due to the inability of the
U.S. Legislature and the international community to create a comprehen-
sive mechanism to regulate and enforce corporate behavior, corporations
and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have responded to pres-
sure for greater accountability by developing private codes of conduct to
internally regulate corporate activity. Initially, U.S. companies adopted
voluntary codes of conduct as a self-regulatory mechanism to avoid anti-
trust prosecution in the 1960s. 2 Today, pressure on corporate accounta-
bility extends beyond antitrust issues and includes behavior relating to
financial, environmental, and social issues.
To operate efficiently, to maintain a positive public image, and to
avoid civil and criminal liability, companies need to understand and re-
spond to pressure for greater transparency. 3 Adopting sustainability re-
ports may be a way for companies to meet these demands. Sustainable is
a popular buzzword that lacks a structured definition, but includes the
integration of social, environmental, and economic factors to obtain a
long-term solution that addresses these factors. Sustainability reports
look at the social, economic, and environmental aspects of a company's
operations to determine if a company can operate with long-term viabil-
ity while minimizing the negative impacts of its operations. Since
problems are multi-faceted, a sustainable solution requires more than one
avenue (international law, the judiciary, regulatory agencies, or the legis-
industry; [t]o tirelessly work to narrow the gap between principle and practice, whilst making
fun, passion and care part of our daily lives." The Body Shop International PLC, Our Reason
for Being: Mission Statement, available at http://www.thebodyshop.com/web/tbsgl/
aboutjreason.jsp (last visited Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter The Body Shop Mission Statement].
Ben and Jerry's mission statement is comprised of three parts: a product mission; an economic
mission; and a social mission. Ben & Jerry's Homemade Holdings, Inc., Our Mission State-
ment, available at http://www.benjerry.com/our-company/our-mission/ (last visited Feb. 9
2004) [hereinafter Ben & Jerry's Mission Statement]. In addition, both companies actively
pursue actions that further their social ideals. The Body Shop supports community trade, often
using indigenous groups practicing their traditional crafts as suppliers; is against animal testing
in cosmetic products; is involved in several campaigns to defend human rights; and works to
produce products that have a limited environmental impact, as well as advocating for environ-
mental causes such as supporting the development of renewable energy. The Body Shop Mis-
sion Statement, supra. Ben & Jerry's uses packing techniques that minimize environmental
impacts; minimizes energy use in its production; actively promotes sustainable agriculture;
promotes causes like building of community play-spaces for children; and has an ice-cream
flavor that highlights its campaign to fight global warming. Ben & Jerry's Mission Statement,
supra.
2 See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 649-51
(1995) (finding that self-regulation through corporate compliance programs is key to avoiding
criminal liability).
3 Warren Bailey, Address at External Risk in International Business, Johnson Graduate
School of Management (Oct. 29, 2002) (notes on file with author).
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lature) to get a solution.4 One avenue by itself cannot provide for a sus-
tainable solution. 5 An effective response must be comprehensive and all
actors need to participate. 6 With an effective sustainability report, com-
panies can avoid criticism of their business practices and expand their
business potential by appearing socially and environmentally conscious.
7
This note will explore international and domestic actors and their
possible role in working toward the goal of socially responsible corporate
behavior. After exploring the various actors, this note will analyze self-
regulation through sustainability reports as a way to achieve corporate
accountability. Part I looks at the history of codes of conduct and gov-
ernment reaction to corporate activity, both of which are usually in re-
sponse to specific corporate scandals. Part II examines the pressure from
various stakeholders-the public (consumers and investors), NGOs, the
judiciary, the legislature, and the international community-in reaction
to corporate behavior. All stakeholders need to participate for companies
to achieve socially responsible behavior, as an individual response fails
to provide an adequate solution.
In response to the various pressures, some corporations implement
sustainability reports. Part III analyzes sustainability reports to deter-
mine their impact on company operations. Though the reports are not
legally binding and often lack an outside enforcement mechanism, they
signify a company's attempt to change its policies. This attempt can cre-
ate a favorable public perception and may limit litigation. To be effec-
tive, a sustainable report requires a collective response by regulatory
agencies, the judiciary, and the legislature, as well as an international
consensus of what behavior is acceptable. With external enforcement,
sustainability reports can achieve corporate accountability. Independent
review of company activities, which a NGO can do, is the best way to
check behavior.
4 See generally John C. Dernbach, Toward a National Sustainable Development Strat-
egy, 10 Buii. ENvTL. L.J. 69 (2003).
5 Id.
6 Kofi Annan, Global Compact Can Achieve its Goals Only if Large Companies Join
Initiative, Secretary-General Tells Meeting of CEOs, DAVOS, Jan. 30, 2004 [hereinafter Annan
2004] ("If businesses were willing to work together with the United Nations and other part-
ners, such as global labour and civil society, then we could find solutions which no actor alone
can produce; and if there were indeed willingness to learn and conduct a dialogue, then we
could move from confrontation to cooperation.").
7 See Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the
Henhouse?, 24 U. MIAMI INTMR-AM. L. REV. 399, 431 n.167 (1993).
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I. HISTORY OF CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
Today, legislative and public pressure is usually in response to ma-
jor headlines highlighting corporate scandals.8 Codes of conduct first
became prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, as corporations began to see
codes as a way to avoid antitrust prosecution. 9 When the public focused
their attention on foreign bribery scandals in the 1970s,' 0 Congress
passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA")," which
regulates the foreign activities of U.S. companies.' 2 In response to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") voluntary disclosure
program and the FCPA's directives for internal controls, companies de-
veloped codes of conduct to limit criminal liability for internal behav-
ior.' 3 Insider-trading scandals during the 1980s brought about more
8 See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 2, at 650-62; see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corpo-
rate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578-98 (1990). See generally Michael S. Baram,
Multinational Corporations, Private Codes, and Technology Transfer for Sustainable Devel-
opment, 24 ENVTL. L. 33 (1994).
9 See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 2, at 649-50.
10 Investigations into bribery originated with Watergate-the Special Prosecutor charged
corporations of illegally using funds during the 1972 presidential campaign. Pitt & Gros-
kaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1582. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) got involved
and initiated a voluntary disclosure program for questionable payments. Id. The SEC also
made internal investigations and publicly disclosed the results. Id. These disclosures captured
public attention, and "[iun the wake of public disclosures about payments made to foreign
officials by American-based companies, three foreign governments collapsed, American rela-
tions with some of its western allies became strained, and a monarchy was weakened." Id.
See also Peter W. Schroth, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National
Reports to the XVth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V: The United States
and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 599-608 (2002), for an
overview of bribery laws.
I I Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-I, 78dd-
2, 78ff, 78m (1988)).
12 The FCPA applies to subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Id. As the world became
aware of corruption, other countries passed such statutes. The Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") responded by passing the OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 16/FINAL, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1997), at http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/
20novle.htm. The Organization of American States passed the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XXIV.1CICOR/doc.14/96, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996),
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html. The Council of Europe passed the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe. Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption opened for signature Jan. 27, 1999, Preamble, Europ. T.S. No. 173; see also
Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by
Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 315
(2001). In addition, the U.N. General Assembly currently has an ad-hoc committee examining
the possibility of a future U.N. convention against corruption. See generally United Nations,
Ad Hoc Committee on the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, available at http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime-cicp-conventioncorruption-docs.html (last modified Nov.
21, 2003) (containing records of the sessions of the ad hoc committee).
13 See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1585.
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legislative reform. 14 Congress, believing that the current codes of con-
duct were insufficient, passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988.15 Fraud in the defense industry' 6 led to the
Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct,' 7 which
contains a set of principles that companies agree to adopt and enforce as
codes of conduct and a voluntary disclosure program.' 8 When the public
began to increasingly focus on environmental problems, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency introduced the Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement' 9 in 1986 as a way to ensure that companies comply with envi-
ronmental laws. 20  In the latest round of financial fraud and misstate-
ments, Congress reacted to public outrage by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,21 which contains comprehensive guidelines for the financial
statements of public companies.
22
The most comprehensive approach to self-regulation regarding so-
cial impacts began in 1977, when twelve U.S. companies reacted to
apartheid in South Africa by developing a private code of conduct known
14 See id. at 1587-93. Though Congress has regulated insider trading since creating the
SEC, Congress developed new regulations in response to scandals in the 1980s. Id. at 1587-
90. The wave of insider trading scandals emerged with an anonymous letter to the Merrill
Lynch compliance department, regarding activities of two employees; this letter lead to a
"domino" effect of prosecutions and investigations into different inside trading activities
throughout the decade. Id.
15 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t-1, 78u,
78u-1, 78f, 78kk, 80b-4a (1988)); Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1587-90.
16 After publicity over $600 toilet seats, President Regan established the Packard Com-
mission to investigate into defense contractor abuses. Rattling the Pentagon, L.A. TIMES,
March 5, 1986 (home edition), at 2, 4. In a 1986 poll, respondents thought the government
could save 45 cents of every defense dollar by eliminating waste and fraud. Charlie Gofen,
Crying Foul Over Defense Spending; Poll of Hawks, Doves and Others Shows Perception of
Waste and Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1986, at A]. Sixty-five percent of the respondents
thought fraud and waste comprised more of the defense budget compared to 10 to 20 years
prior, and 56% felt that there was more waste in defense spending compared to the private
sector. Id.
17 48 C.F.R. § 203.7000 (1988). The Initiative requires that "[g]ovemment contractors
must conduct themselves with the highest degree of integrity and honesty. Contractors should
have standards of conduct and internal control systems that (1) Are suitable to the size of the
company and the extent of their involvement in Government contracting; (2) Promote such
standards; (3) Facilitate timely discovery and disclosure of improper conduct in connection
with Government contracts; and (4) Ensure corrective measures are promptly instituted and
carried out. Id. The Initiative was adopted after a study by the Packard Commission. Pitt &
Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1594-95
18 Id. at 1594-95.
19 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,006 (July 9, 1986).
20 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1244-45 (1998).
21 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 of the U.S. code).
22 See Recent Legislation, Corporate Law-Congress Passes Corporate and Accounting
Fraud Legislation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 728 (2002).
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as the Sullivan Principles. 23 The Sullivan Principles demonstrate the
positive impact that a code of conduct can have when civil society, com-
panies, and the legislature work together to confront a social problem.
By 1986, 150 corporations had joined the Sullivan Principles, which
called for nondiscriminatory practices in wages, health, housing, trans-
portation, and job advancement opportunities. 24 Required dues from the
signers funded an outside audit procedure, which the accounting firm
Arthur Little conducted. 25 Congress codified the Sullivan Principles in
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,26 which required any
company with more than 25 employees to adopt the Sullivan Princi-
ples. 27 Civil society also played an integral role, through boycotts and
investment decisions, in pressuring the South African government to
eliminate apartheid. 28 The role of the Sullivan Principles in corporate
activities, however, continues. Currently, several plaintiffs have filed
class actions lawsuits against many companies on behalf of black South
Africans for discriminatory practices during apartheid, the outcomes of
which have yet to be determined. 29
II. PRESSURE AND RESPONSE
Though their reasons for pressure vary, corporations face pressure
from consumers, investors, NGOs, the judiciary, and the legislature. The
international community is a collective force that can also influence ac-
tivity. Increasing scrutiny of non-economic externalities makes ethical
conduct a vital aspect of company operations regardless of whether a
legal duty exists.30
23 The Sullivan Statement of Principles (4th amplification), Nov. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M.
1496 (1985); Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Re-
sponsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1092
(2002).
24 See Westfield, supra note 23, at 1092; William B.T. Mock, Corporate Transparency
and Human Rights, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 15, 21 (2000).
25 See Mock, supra note 24, at 21.
26 Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 5001 (1988 & Supp. III
1991) (repealed by Pub. L. 103-149, 4(a)(1)(2), Nov. 23, 1993, 107 Stat. 1504 (as of the date
on which the President certified to the Congress that an interim government, elected on a
nonracial basis through free and fair elections, had taken office in South Africa)).
27 See Westfield, supra note 23, at 1092-94.
28 See Big Stores Surprised by Anti-Apartheid Group Boycott, DAILY NEWS Rac., Jan. 8,
1987, at 9.
29 See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 (S.D.N.Y.
May 21, 2003); John S. Friedman, Paying for Apartheid; Comment; American Companies
Being Sued, THE NATION, June 2, 2003, at 7; Bruce Zagaris, 2 Class Actions Against 34 Mul-
tinational Companies Claim Damages for Apartheid Support, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT LAW
REPORTER 7 (2003).
30 See Baker, supra note 7, at 408-09.
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A. THE PUBLIC
While corporations are an integral part of the economy, the public
can be hostile toward corporate activity. The public increasingly focuses
on the social and environmental impacts of corporate activity, in addition
to criminal accountability. The public has two different views of a cor-
poration's role in society-either a corporation's duty is to shareholders
and thus its role is to maximize shareholder profits, or it has duties to
other constituencies in society besides shareholders and thus it needs to
act in the interest of all constituencies.
1. Consumers
Consumers can influence business activities through their purchas-
ing powering. If consumer desire for corporate responsibility is strong
enough, consumer-purchasing patterns will reflect this belief.31 When
this occurs, companies need to address the social and environmental con-
cerns of investors to maximize profits.32 Pressure for social responsibil-
ity can "influence the climate of opinion and collectively bring
continuing pressures leading to step-by-step improvement of corporate
standards."'33 Today, with increasing consumer awareness, "[m]arket ec-
onomics [can be] harnessed to support social responsibility, rather than
being allowed to serve as the barrier .... ,"34 The media plays an impor-
tant role in forming and shaping public opinions by reporting on corpo-
rate behavior and the NGO reactions to corporate behavior. 35 Media
publicity has the greatest impact on companies whose sales heavily de-
pend on brand image and company goodwill.
36
With an increase in consumer awareness and pressure for accounta-
bility, companies are now more responsive to protests and boycotts, and
are increasingly protective of a positive public image. For example,
companies such as Levi Strauss have pulled their product out of coun-
tries with gross human rights violations and restricted investments in
countries with known human rights abuses. 37 The actions of Levi's are a
31 When consumer behavior is strong enough, "corporations seeking to maximize their
performance are under pressure to comply." Blumberg, supra note 12, at 319.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 319.
34 Id.
35 Some evidence suggests that corporations improve worker conditions after receiving
media attention. Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1431, 1437-38 (2002).
36 Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarr~re, Enforcing International Labor Rights
through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 674-75 (1995).
37 Human Rights: Ethical Shopping, THE ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 35 (reporting on a
reduction of investments in Saipan factories after conditions were found unacceptable); Wil-
liam Beaver, Levi's Is Leaving China, 38 Bus. HORIZONS 2, Mar. 1, 1995 (reporting that
Levi's ended business dealings with China due to human right violations); Kathryn L. Boyd,
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result of increasing public awareness of human rights abuses and public
pressure on U.S. companies to avoid forced labor.38 Consumers are also
increasingly concerned with worker conditions, given publicity about
overseas sweatshops. 39 In a 1999 study, in response to sweatshop labor
concerns, 76 percent of the respondents would pay a higher price for a
product that a company did not make in a sweatshop.40 Eighty-one per-
cent of respondents felt that U.S. companies should uphold U.S. environ-
mental standards in countries with less stringent laws purely on moral
grounds. 41 In addition, 86 percent (69 percent strongly) of respondents
felt that U.S. companies should abide by U.S. health and safety standards
for foreign workers on moral grounds. 42
In response to an active public campaign about worker conditions,
Nike has become increasingly interested in maintaining a positive image
and has begun to address worker conditions.43 Nike developed a code of
conduct regarding worker conditions and initiated a public campaign
highlighting the positive conditions in its factories.44 But actions do not
always follow publicity. The NGO CorpWatch filed suit in California
court against Nike in 1998 for false advertising in its treatment of
Vietnamese workers.45 In state court, the issue turned on free speech.
Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate
Level, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1139, 1143.
38 See David Moberg, Bringing Down Niketown: Consumers Can Help, but Only Unions
and Labor Laws Will End Sweatshops, NATION, June 7, 1999, at 15.
39 See id.
40 Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on Globalization: A Study of
U.S. Public Attitudes (Mar. 28, 2000), at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Globalization/
executive-summary.html. The study does note that consumer behavior may not correspond to
responses. Id. But the fact that respondents would be willing to support higher prices for non-
sweatshop labor indicates that "if the US were to require imported products to be made in non-
sweatshop conditions and Americans were to hear that, as a result, the costs of products were
somewhat higher, most Americans would probably find this unobjectionable." Id. Other polls
indicate similar attitudes toward sweatshop labor, for example, "[a] November 1999 study by
Marymount University's Center for Ethical Concerns also found that Americans would pay
more for non-sweatshop garments. In that poll, 86% said that would be 'willing to pay up to
$1 more for a $20 garment guaranteed to be made in a legitimate shop."' Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Allen Jenkins, What Would You Do? Nike v. Kasky Case Puts Public Relations
Campaigns under New Scrutiny, COMM. WORLD, April 1, 2003, at 14; Moberg, supra note 38
("No company wants to become the next Nike, which-despite its elaborate public relations
response-has been dogged for most of the decade by well-documented charges that its
closely controlled contractors pay subminimum wages, prefer countries with regimes that sup-
press labor organizing, expose workers to hazardous conditions, demand long working hours
and even physically abuse employees at Nike's Southeast Asian factories."); Patrick Harverson
& Robert Corzine, In Defense of International Reputations, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 31,
1997, at 16.
44 See Dickerson, supra note 35, at 1432-33.
45 Kasky v. Nike Inc, 45 P.3d 243 (2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (Jan. 10, 2003),
cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (June 26, 2003) (dismissal of certiorari due to violation of the
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The California Supreme Court held that the company's public relations
campaign violated California's strict ban on false advertising because
Nike intended for the public relations campaign on worker conditions to
"maintain and increase its sales and profits."' 46 These events signify the
impact that public pressure can have on companies and the litigation po-
tential in response to demands for social accountability. Corporate re-
sponse to human rights campaigns represent a "new corporate social
responsibility-a concept that is descriptive and normative, and is based
on the will of a community far broader than the narrow commercial-
corporate arena in which corporations have traditionally been thought to
operate." '47
2. Investors
Profits or social reasons can motivate investors. Both types of in-
vestors may want companies to adopt more sustainable practices. Inves-
tors motivated by economic returns may advocate for accountability if it
can increase dividends. In the past, religious orders or NGOs would buy
a few shares of stock and propose corporate resolutions protecting human
rights and labor rights, which seldom passed.4 8 Today, institutional in-
vestors are making such demands. 4 9 In the wake of recent financial
scandals, 50 companies can address investor concerns about financial ac-
countability by developing an ethical business code. 5' Richard Francis,
head of the NGO Association of Chartered Certified Accountants in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, argues that an ethical code of conduct makes
business sense, as businesses can minimize internal risks like fraud.
52
Francis also notes that investors value and invest in companies with
transparency and highly ethical standards that protect executives from
final decision doctrine, no standing by either party to invoke the court, and a premature adjudi-
cation of a novel constitutional question); see David G. Savage, Justices to Hear Nike Free-
Speech Claim: The Shoemaker Says its Public Statements are Shielded; Critics Say They are
Advertising. The Case May Become Landmark in 1st Amendment Law. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2003 (Saturday Home Edition), at Cl. For an overview of Nike's campaign to protect its
image and the Kasky suit that resulted, see Jenkins, supra note 43.
46 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258.
47 Dickerson, supra note 35, at 1433 (footnotes omitted).
48 Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrre, supra note 36, at 675.
49 Id.
50 See William F. Dietrich, Legal and Ethical Issues for Attorneys Dealing with Finan-
cial Data: Heightened Scrutiny after the Enron and Andersen Debacle, 1325 PRc. L. INST.
925, 934 (2002) ("Even if few statutory or regulatory changes result from the Enron debacle,
the SEC and the market will be more watchful of attorneys' roles related to financial
statements.").
51 See Ethical Code of Conduct for CFOs a Must, Says ACCA (press release) (Oct. 22,
2002), at http://www.accaglobal.com/news/releases/696082.
52 Id. Total senior executive Jean-Pierre Cordier states "Investors want the best possible
investment. Even if ethics is not their cup of tea, they consider companies that take into
account good ethical principles to be well managed." Gumbel, infra note 58.
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liability.53 Socially responsible companies can protect their reputation in
media reports and among consumers. 54 Reputation is important, as even
the threat of a lawsuit in social or environmental areas can cause share
prices to drop.55
Social investing is a type of investment activity that invests in so-
cially accountable companies, as social as well as economic reasons mo-
tivate investors.5 6 While the market performance of these funds is
debatable, 57 social investing is a growing trend among investors, after
mainstreaming during the 1980s South African boycott. 58 "With more
refined screening criteria built around corporate transparency and ac-
countability, social investing could become a player in the process-and
fulfill its promise to encourage more socially and environmentally re-
sponsible corporate behavior." 59
B. NGOs
NGOs use a variety of methods to pressure companies to change
their conduct. Media campaigns can bring awareness to issues and can
mobilize public action. 60 The "real or perceived unethical conduct" by
multinational companies can influence public relations. 61 NGOs also re-
port on company behavior that may be problematic. Enron is an example
of the various problems that can arise when a company has limited trans-
parency. Besides the financial fraud that led to its ultimate collapse, 62
the NGO Human Rights Watch issued a report in 1999 accusing the com-
pany of "complicity in human rights violations" through its subsidiary's
53 Gumbel, infra note 58. See also Michelle Chan-Fishel, After Enron: How Accounting
and SEC Reform Can Promote Corporate Accountability While Restoring Public Confidence,
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10967, *19 (2002).
54 Examples of corporate responses include improvements of working conditions after
receiving media attention, voluntary compliance with the OECD Convention, and selling anti-
HIV/AIDS medication to developing countries at a reduced price due to pressure from nega-
tive media coverage. Dickerson, supra note 35, at 1437-41.
55 Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National
Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 451, 464-65
(2001).
56 For an overview of what is social investing and the type of investments, see http://
www.socialfunds.com.
57 Compare Jon Entine, Commentary, The Backlash of Social Investing, Cm. TRIB., Oct.
14, 2002, at CN19 ("[S]creened companies do not outperform the market.") with Melissa Al-
lison, Manufacturers Make Cleaner Air, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 2002, at N 1 ("Over the past five
years, the stocks of environmental leaders in almost every industrial sector outperformed their
non-environmentally conscious counterparts by 300 to 3,000 basis points a year.").
58 See Entine, supra note 57. In Europe, about $40 billion is invested in these funds.
Peter Gumbel, Total Clean Up, TIME, Jan. 26, 2004 (Bonus Edition), at AIO.
59 Entine, supra note 57.
60 See Klaus M. Leisinger, Business Forum: Multinationals and the Third World; Sell
Solutions, Not Just Products, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1988, § 3 (Late City Final Edition), at 3.
61 Id.
62 See Dietrich, supra note 50.
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work in building an electrical power plant in India. 63 The report accused
Enron of directly benefiting from the human rights violations by the In-
dia state government of Maharashta. 64 Human Rights Watch believes
that the Maharashta government suppressed local freedom of expression
and peaceful assembly, as well as arbitrarily detained, threatened, and
used excessive force against residents. 65 Human Rights Watch also ac-
cused Enron of paying and materially supporting state forces that com-
mitted human rights abuses by using the state police to protect the plant
site and allowing the police to use company helicopters to monitor and
harass local activists. 66 Further accusations include the failure to re-
spond to complaints that the contractors threatened or attacked local vil-
lagers that opposed the project.67 Enron, however, did not respond to
questions about the human rights violations.
Companies often develop codes in response to public pressure and
NGO demands. For example, Starbucks developed a code of conduct in
1995 for working conditions at their Guatemalan supplier plantations. 68
Starbucks developed its code in collaboration with the U.S.-Guatemala
Labor Education Project, a coalition of religious, labor, and environmen-
tal organizations in Washington. 69 When the NGO first approached
Starbucks, the president declined to meet with the members, and cited
CARE as Starbucks' "social cause."' 70 The coalition began a public cam-
paign, which included passing out pamphlets in front of stores, and
drafted a code of conduct for Starbucks to adopt. 71 Starbucks and the
U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project began communicating, and
"It]he Project became convinced that Starbucks' social responsibility
concern was genuine, and Starbucks was reassured that the Project was
not a 'company-buster' but sincerely interested in improving labor rights
and working conditions in Guatemala. '72 The code of conduct devel-
oped with the Project represents the company's transition from funding
mere social causes to incorporating the social impacts of its operations
into company policies. Starbucks now has a comprehensive code of con-
63 Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Violations, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
64 Id.
65 Id..
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrre, supra note 36, at 683-85.
69 See id. at 683.
70 See id. at 683-84. Operating in over 60 countries, "CARE is one of the world's larg-
est private international humanitarian organizations, committed to helping families in poor
communities improve their lives and achieve lasting victories over poverty." CARE, About
CARE, at http://www.careusa.org/about/index.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
71 Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarr~re, supra note 36, at 684.
72 Id. at 685.
2004]
514 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:503
duct, the Corporate Responsibility Annual Report, which covers worker
rights as well other aspects of its operation that relate to socially respon-
sible behavior.73 Starbucks first published this report in 2001. 74
NGOs are also active in litigation, bringing lawsuits against compa-
nies for issues ranging from false advertising to human rights viola-
tions. 75 NGOs can financially pressure companies by initiating
consumer boycotts. Other ways of exerting economic influence arise
through stock exchange listings and disclosure requirements, minority
shareholder resolutions, and pressure from investment funds.76 When
companies agree to work with NGO demands, the NGO can audit
compliance.
Some issue-oriented NGOs specifically deal with corporate codes,
while other NGOs include corporate accountability as a part of their ac-
tivities. 77 Social Accountability International is a human rights organiza-
tion dedicated to improving workplaces and communities by developing
and implementing socially responsible corporate standards. 78 To ensure
compliance, the organization calls for independent auditors to monitor
the voluntary standards. 79 The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer
Rights is currently creating a corporate accountability agenda to prevent
financial fraud in order to protect consumers, taxpayers, pensioners, and
investors. 80 Human Rights Watch, which has offices throughout the
globe, has a special division on corporations and human rights. 81
The Fair Labor Association ("FLA") is a NGO that has developed a
workplace code of conduct to eliminate sweatshops in the U.S. and
abroad. 82 The FLA code focuses on employee rights issues, such as
forced labor, child labor, harassment or abuse, nondiscrimination, free-
dom of association, collective bargaining, wages and benefits, hours of
73 Starbucks, Corporate Social Responsibility, Annual Report (2002), available at http://
www.starbucks.com/aboutus/CSR_FY02_AR.pdf. The certified public accounting firm Moss
Adams conducted an independent verification of the 2002 Report. Id. at 2, 32.
74 Id. at 2. The goal of the Report is "to provide transparency on [its] business practices,
measurements of [its] performance and benchmarks for future reporting." Id.
75 See supra note 43-47 & accompanying text.
76 Ward, supra note 55, at 465-66.
77 See David Petrasek, Corporate Legal Accountability and Human Rights-Beyond Vol-
untarism, at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content-print.asp?ContentlD=55.
78 Social Accountability International (intro website); at http://www.cepaa.org (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2004).
79 Id.
80 See Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Corporate Accountability, at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/corporate (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). The Enron collapse
and following corporate frauds triggered the organization's push for corporate accountability.
Id.
81 Human Rights Watch, Corporations & Human Rights, at http://hrw.org/doc/?t=
corporations.
82 Fair Labor Association, Workplace Code of Conduct, at http://www.fairlabor.org/
htmllCodeOfConduct/index.html [hereinafter FLA Workplace].
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work, and overtime compensation.8 3 A company that adopts the FLA
code accepts external monitoring of contractor factories. 8 4 To ensure
higher industry standards and to obtain consumer confidence that prod-
ucts, regardless of the contractors or suppliers, are made using humane
standards, the FLA states:
Any Company that determines to adopt the Work-
place Code of Conduct shall, in addition to complying
with all applicable laws of the country of manufacture,
comply with and support the Workplace Code of Con-
duct in accordance with the attached Principles of Moni-
toring and shall apply the higher standard in cases of
differences or conflicts. Any Company that determines
to adopt the Workplace Code of Conduct also shall re-
quire its licensees and contractors and, in the case of a
retailer, its suppliers to comply with applicable local
laws and with this Code in accordance with the attached
Principles of Monitoring and to apply the higher stan-
dard in cases of difference of conflicts. 85
The FLA's board of directors reflects a partnership between indus-
try and civil society. The members include Daniel R. Gluckman from
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP as Chair of the Board, and repre-
sentatives from Reebook International Ltd., Princeton University, the
National Council of Churches, the National Consumers League, Phillips
Van Heusen Corp., Adidas-Salomon, the University of Notre Dame,
Nike Inc., Levi Strauss & Co., the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, the Orville H. Schell Center for Human Rights, the University
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and Liz Claiborne. 86
C. THE JUDICIARY
Tribunals in either the home country (the company headquarters) or
the host country (where production occurs) can regulate corporate activ-
ity. The judiciary in the home country is an important enforcement
mechanism, as violations like unfair labor practices often occur in host
counties that lack an accountable government or lack the resources that
83 Id.
84 For a comprehensive overview of FLA's monitoring program, see Fair Labor Associa-
tion, Monitoring Guidance and Compliance Benchmarks, at http://www.fairlabor.org/html/
monitoringtext.html.
85 FLA Workplace, supra note 82.
86 FLA, Board of Directors, at http://www.fairlabor.org/html/affiliatesboard.htm.
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are necessary for effective enforcement. 87 The legal evolution of corpo-
rate accountability follows the development of holding individuals crimi-
nally responsible for serious human rights abuses since holding states
accountable for human rights violations was an inadequate way to
achieve accountability. 88 A problem with judicial activity is how to hold
a corporation accountable, given the corporate structure.
89
Though the judiciary has helped foster conditions that allow for eco-
nomic growth, courts have also played with the idea that corporations
have a social responsibility. In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, a
shareholder sued for loss of income from the board of directors' decision
to make charitable contributions. 90 The Delaware Court of Chancery
stated "unless corporations carry an increasing share of the burden of
supporting charitable and educational causes that the business advantages
now reposed in corporations by law may well prove to be unacceptable
to the representatives of an aroused public." 9' But charitable contribu-
tions must be reasonable, which the court determined to be within the
federal tax deduction for charitable gifts in the Internal Revenue Code.
92
The court reasoned that the "relatively small loss of immediate income"
to shareholders "is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing from
the placing of such gift in channels where it serves to benefit those in
need ... thereby benefiting [shareholders] in the long run."9 3
Since production occurs in the host country, the host country has
jurisdiction over production activities. Nicaragua recently enacted a law,
entitled "Emergency Law for Banana Workers Injured by Usage of
DBCP-Based Manufactured Pesticides," which allows Nicaraguan work-
ers to sue foreign companies that used DBCP, which is a pesticide.
94
87 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 82 (2002).
88 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 464 (2001).
89 For a discussion of cases in the United States, England, Canada, and Australia, see
Ward, supra note 55, at 456-58. But see Baker, supra note 7, at 400, 414-15 (finding that
private codes are an effective method to overcome public law limitations in order to make
multi-national corporations ethically accountable and to balance corporate negotiations with
developing countries).
90 257 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. Ch. 1969).
91 Id. at 404.
92 Id. at 405.
93 Id.
94 Ley Especial para la Tramitacion de Juicios Promovidos por las Personas Afectadas
por el Uso de Pesticidas Fabricados a Base de DBCP, Ley No. 364, G.D.O. No 12, del 17 de
Encero del 2001. The law requires corporate defendants to put up a US$100,000 bond within
three months of being served with a suit regarding DBCP, a pesticide used in banana-growing
regions. Id. at Art. 4; David Gonzalez with Samuel Lowenberg, Banana Workers Get Day in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at 1. Field workers in Central America, the Caribbean,
Africa, and the Philippines complain of sterility, cancer, and birth defects in children resulting
from exposure to DBCP. Gonzalez, supra. As a result of the Nicaraguan law, over 400 cases
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The Environmental Protection Agency suspended the use of DBCP in the
U.S. in 1979 after studies showed that it increased the risk of cancer and
caused sterility and genetic damage. 95 Today, foreign workers on banana
plantations that supply American markets are exposed to DBCP.96 Using
the Nicaragua law, a Nicaraguan judge in December 2002 ordered three
U.S. companies (Dow Chemical Company, Shell Oil, and Standard Fruit
Company) to pay $490 million to 583 banana workers for exposing them
to DBCP.97 But the litigation and enforcement potential of foreign suits
is limited given the desire of countries to attract foreign investment. 98
Further, such countries often lack an effective legal system or the laws
necessary to bring litigation.99
The home country judiciary may also be a way to achieve accounta-
bility. The U.S. judiciary has been hesitant to hold companies accounta-
ble for overseas actions, but a recent interpretation of the 1789 Alien
Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") has opened the door for such cases. °° Doe
v. Unocal 0 is the first United States case to find that a U.S. corporation
may be accountable for foreign human rights abuses.10 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that there was sufficient evidence to hold Unocal liable for aid-
ing and abetting with the human rights abuses that the Myanmar military
committed in furtherance of a joint oil pipeline project between Unocal
and the Myanmar government.103 The court held the aiding and abetting
have been filed on behalf of 7,000 plaintiffs, against foreign companies for compensation over
$9.6 billion. Id.
95 44 Fed. Reg. 65,169 (1979); EPA, Technology Transfer Network Air Toxics Website,
1,2-Dibromo-3-Choloropropane (DBCP), at http://www.epa.gov.cgi-bin/epaprintonly.cgi.
96 Gonzalez, supra note 94.
97 Franco v. Dow Chemical, 3d Civil Court (Dec. 11, 2002) (unpublished); see Lawyer:
Nicaraguan Judge Orders U.S. Companies to Pay $490 Million to Banana Workers Affected
by Pesticide, AssocIATED PREss, Dec. 14, 2002, available at WL, APWIRESPLUS. Dole
admitted that it increased its legal reserves by over $10 million because of the lawsuits. Gon-
zalez, supra note 94.
98 Companies also lobby foreign government officials. Dow Chemical Company, Shell
Oil, and Dole have been working with the Bush administration to pressure Nicaragua to repeal
the law. Gonzalez, supra note 94 ("The companies 'implied that they would do everything
short of declaring war,' a senior Nicaraguan official said.").
99 This insight stems from my own personal experience.
100 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that a violation of customary international law gives rise to cause of action and jurisdiction
because customary international law is part of domestic law) with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (finding that customary law
does not give rise to a cause of action and therefore ATCA does not give both a cause of action
and jurisdiction).
101 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002).
102 See generally David I. Becker, A Callfor the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183 (1999).
103 See Unocal, U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 32-38.
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standard for liability to be "knowing practical assistance or encourage-
ment which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."' 1 4
The court remanded the decision to determine whether Unocal intended
to facilitate commission of the crimes of forced labor, murder, and
rape. 10 5 Unocal creates the potential to hold other corporations account-
able for foreign activities. Courts could hold corporations liable for vio-
lating human right norms like genocide, torture, and slavery; these are
crimes that by definition apply to private actors.' 0 6 Corporations could
also be liable for human right violations when they act with public offi-
cials. 10 7 The problem is that Unocal lacks specific guidelines for compa-
nies to tailor their actions to avoid liability, especially when they operate
in a country with a government that actively disregards human rights.10 8
But with cases against companies like Citigroup, Shell, Ford, and
IBM, 109 the judiciary will further define the doctrine's exact scope unless
corporate pressure causes the legislature to repeal the ATCA.I10
Complainants also use class action lawsuits to hold companies ac-
countable for foreign and domestic activities. NGOs and concerned indi-
viduals have filed class action lawsuits against companies for violating
"[n]on-traditional economic and property rights, environmental rights, as
well as cultural and social rights."' 1 Included in the class action cate-
gory are lawsuits against companies like Daimler-Chrysler, Deutsche
Bank, BMW, and Volkswagen for their participation with the Nazi gov-
ernment during the Holocaust. 1 2 Plaintiffs have also filed lawsuits for
reparations from companies that profited from slavery. 1 3 As previously
104 Id. at 36.
105 Id. at 83.
106 See Stephens, supra note 87, at 86-87.
107 Id.
108 See Becker, supra note 87, at 206-07.
109 These companies are being sued for apartheid-era activities. Friedman, supra note 29;
Zagaris, supra note 29.
1 10 Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm, Suits that Claim Overseas Abuse are Putting U.S.
Executives on Alert and their Lawyers on Call, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 1. For further
discussion on corporate lobbying to repeal the ACTA, see infra note 118.
1 11 Boyd, supra note 20, at 1169.
112 In response to the pending suits, some companies have announced plans to contribute
to a German government fund designed to compensate Holocaust victims and their heirs. See
id. For an overview of the Holocaust-era lawsuits, which led to settlements for many victims
and their heirs, see Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy: Holo-
caust Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 683 (2003).
113 Ira J. Hadnot, Slave Descendants Bound and Determined to be 'Made Whole Again',
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2002 (noting that reparation advocates disa-
gree if money would go to individuals or social programs and critics point out that there is no
fair way to determine what payments should be); Al Swanson, Commentary: Reparations Suits
Fuel Debate, U.P.I., Jan. 8, 2004. Since March 2002, five federal lawsuits have been filed
against banks and tobacco and cotton companies for reparations for 35 million descendents of
African slaves. Swanson, supra. One class action suit is based on a 2002 ordinance of the
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discussed, class actions are also pending against 34 multi-national com-
panies for racial practices during apartheid." 14
Given the potential litigation impact, companies and corporate lob-
bying groups are interested in minimizing legal action. The National
Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC") had a closed-door seminar for its mem-
bers, which includes companies with pending class action lawsuits." 15
The NFTC vice-president discovered that many of the general counsel
from major corporations at the seminar were not fully aware of their
potential liability under the ATCA. 116 To limit the reach of liability,
groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association
of Manufacturers, and the NFTC are currently lobbying Congress to
change the ATCA.1 7 Though these lobbying groups may be powerful in
Congress, many recognize that the ATCA and class action lawsuits are
part of the broader globalization policy debate.1 8 Partner Robert Meyer
of the law firm Foley & Lardner warns, "The breadth of the lawsuits and
the number of companies sued have made a lot more people pay atten-
tion .... [But t]he plaintiffs lawyers have tried to push too far. It could
be counterproductive for them."' 19 The problem is determining a strat-
egy to combat these suits. 120 Competitive Enterprise Institute's President
Fred Smith at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce forum stated that "[t]he
moral framing of this issue has been disastrous for us. [The perception
Chicago City Council, entitled the "Chicago Slave Era Disclosure Act." Swanson, supra;
Hadnot, supra (noting that other cities like Atlanta and Dallas have passed resolutions that
encourage a federal inquiry into reparations). Lawyers like Alexander Pires, who won a $1
billion settlement for black framers that the U.S. government denied loans; Richard Scruggs,
who got a $368.5 billion settlement against tobacco companies; and Jonnie Cochran. Hadnot,
supra.
114 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. "The complaints claim that the banks
provided the funding that kept the apartheid government in power; that without oil, the police
and military could not have functioned and the economy would have collapsed; that vehicle
manufacturers supplied military vehicles and that technology companies supplied the resources
for the national identity system. Companies were targeted not simply for doing business in
South Africa but for allegedly supporting the apartheid system and profiting from crimes
against humanity." Friedman, supra note 29.
115 Jim Washer, United States: Clean Up Your Act, ENERGY COMPASS, Feb. 6, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, EINTL File; see also Jenna Greene, supra note 110. ("Bus-
iness advocates nationwide are sounding the alarm about the once-obscure 1789 statutes now
being invoked to hold multinational corporations liable for human rights abuses committed by
government officials around the world.").
116 See Washer, supra note 115.
117 Greene, supra note 110.
118 But this has not stopped some people in government from trying to prevent application
of the ATCA to corporate activity. In May, President Bush signed Executive Order 13303,
which prohibits judicial process against oil companies in Iraq. Opponents allege that President
Bush is trying to circumvent litigation under the ATCA. Jenny B. Davis, Old Law Bares its
Teeth: Alien Tort Claims Act Bites International Firms, 89 A.B.A. J. 20 (Oct. 2003).
1 19 Greene, supra note 110.
120 Id. Covington & Burling partner Stuart Eizenstat argues "once you open up [a] statue,
you never know how it's going to come out... [it] could even get tighter." Id.
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is] we want to make money, and they want human rights. We have yet to
find an effective argument to counter [this perception]."''2 Given public
anger over the financial scandals, the public "might find a new target if
politicians and their corporate sponsors try to tamper with a law that is
currently being used, however expansively, to hold such corporations to
account." 122
Whether or not a country has adequate laws to enforce corporate
accountability, the judiciary is not, by itself, an adequate check. A do-
mestic legal system has inherent limitations on international enforce-
ment.123 Professor Steven Ratner argues that the "exclusive or excessive
focus on [domestic law] would be mistaken, because American princi-
ples of state action, which were developed in U.S. civil rights law and
have proved critical in corporate ATCA cases, cannot simply be trans-
ferred to the international arena."' 124 The corporate structure is a major
barrier to jurisdiction and limits liability. 125 Under the current liability
rules, shareholders are not liable for corporate activities unless a court
pierces the corporate veil.126 Dismissing cases under the forum non con-
veniens also prevents adjudication of foreign activities. 127
121 Id. National Foreign Trade Council president William Reinsch adds "[T]hese are
enormously sympathetic plaintiffs, people who have had terrible things happen to them. It's
difficult for judges to dismiss the cases . I..." Id.
122 Washer, supra note 115; Greene, supra note 110 ("Labor and human rights activists,
religious groups, environmental organizations, and plaintiff lawyers are mobilized to defend
the statute, which they say often provides the only means of redress for victims of atrocities
overseas.").
123 See Blumberg, supra note 12, at 298.
124 Ratner, supra note 88, at 450 (arguing that international law should be used to regulate
corporate activity). For an opposing view, see David T. Griswold, Foreigners Use Obscure
Law to Go After U.S. Companies, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY (Feb. 5, 2003) ("Misuse of the
Alien Tort Claims Act constitutes bad law, bad economics and bad foreign policy. The law
was never intended to confer a new private right of action to aliens .... Hundreds of millions
of poor people around the world will find it more difficult to escape poverty.").
125 See Blumberg, supra note 12 at 299 (finding that though a suit can be brought against
the American parent corporation to enable jurisdiction, this brings with it the "high cost of the
difficulties of establishing either the vicarious liability of the parent corporation for the actions
of the subsidiary or the direct participation of the parent in the activity").
126 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 69-111 (2000). Courts have pierced
the veil and held shareholders, directors, and officers accountable for corporate activities in the
following circumstances: "1) Undercapitalization[;] 2) Failure to observe corporate formali-
ties[;] 3) Non-payment of dividends[;] 4) Insolvency of the corporation "at the time" ... [;] 5)
Siphoning of corporate funds by the dominate shareholder[;] 6) Non-functioning of other of-
ficers and directors besides the defendant[;] 7) Absence of corporate records[;J 8) Non-partici-
pation in corporate affairs by the shareholders other than the defendant[." Id. at 71-72
(footnote omitted).
127 See Anita Bernstein, Conjoining International Human Rights Law with Enterprise Li-
ability for Accidents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 382, 401-02 (2001).
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D. THE LEGISLATURE
Congress has the power to regulate business activity. 28 But the
legislature is generally hesitant to endorse private codes of conduct un-
less public attention highlights an issue that a code could address. 129 The
failure to generate enough political support inhibits legislation for overall
corporate reform.' 30 Congress did introduce but failed to pass the Trans-
parency and Responsibility for U.S. Trade Health Act of 2001, which
would have imposed international environmental, labor, and human
rights standards on U.S corporations with the sanction of denying access
to government trade programs.' 31
The legislative pattern of corrective legislation is a bandage ap-
proach to specific problems and fails to comprehensively prevent all
types of corporate misbehavior. Given the recent scandals, the Senate, in
a 97-0 vote, approved the Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, an
accounting reform and corporate responsibility bill. 132 Nevertheless, the
magnitude and number of recent financial scandals has led to dialogue
among some policymakers to look beyond corrective legislation and to
focus on structural changes. 133
E. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
An international code could be an effective way to regulate global
practic6s, and many argue that this would be the best route to ensure
corporate transparency, especially as major corporations operate in more
than one country.' 34 An effective code would need to include enforce-
ment mechanisms, set specific standards, and cover all aspects of a com-
pany's operation. However, the political difficulty of getting nations to
128 Congress' power to regulate corporations stems from the Commerce Clause in the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3.
129 See supra footnotes 7-20 and accompanying text.; see generally Westfield, supra note
23, at 1096-98.
130 See Blumberg, supra note 12, at 315-16 ("It is likely that scandals of similar magni-
tude [as the illegal foreign campaign contributions and bribery of public officials] will be
required before legislative reforms become a realistic possibility.").
131 H.R. 460, 107th Cong. (2001).
132 The bill enhances penalties in white-collar crime for securities laws, shredding docu-
ments and obstruction of justice, and increases protection for whistleblowers. S. 2010, 107th
Cong. (2002).
133 See Chan-Fishel, supra note 53.
134 See Baram, supra note 8, at 55-65 (noting that most companies fail to transfer envi-
ronmental aspects of their codes in developed countries to their operations in developing coun-
tries); William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Symposium, Human Rights, the UN Global
Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501, 506-07 (2001); Kofi Annan,
Sec-Gen Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in World Eco-
nomic Forum Address, Feb. 2, 1999 [hereinafter Annan 1999].
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ratify an effective international code hinders this method.' 35 In the
1970s, international organizations drafted, but seldom adopted, voluntary
codes of conduct, including the never-adopted U.N. Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations. 136 Though not adopted, the drafts are useful
as they provide a framework and highlight the important issues. A com-
prehensive regulation on specific areas like environmental conduct
would be difficult to develop given the policy and economic considera-
tions of different countries.137
Even if countries develop effective guidelines, regulation and en-
forcement is another hurdle. The U.N. Global Compact, launched in
1999, attempts to internationally regulate behavior. 138 The Global Com-
pact is a code of conduct with nine principles that relate to human rights,
labor, and the environment that companies can voluntarily adopt.' 39 The
code, however, lacks enforcement mechanisms and sanctions.' 40
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") also drafted a code of
conduct-the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises of Social Policy.' 4' The ILO code is more comprehen-
sive than the U.N. Global Compact, regulating issues such as
subcontracting and job creation, but compliance is voluntary and it lacks
enforcement sanctions.' 42
135 Peggy Rodgers Kalas, The Implication of Jota v. Texaco and the Accountability of
Transnational Corporations, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV 47, 64-67 (2000).
136 The U.N. Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations focuses on corporate ac-
tions in developing countries, and includes issues regarding general human ights and the fair
treatment of workers. See Stephens, supra note 87, at 79.
137 Id. at 66-67.
138 See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 9,
2004). U.N. Secretary General Annan states that the Global Compact is "a useful platform for
business, labor and civil society to conduct a dialogue.... It has helped break down barriers
and overcome confrontation, as the different groups of actors have learned to listen to each
other and to act together. The Compact has also helped to bridge the historical divide between
the UN and business by giving many UN organizations a gateway to partnerships with busi-
ness." Annan 2004, supra note 6.
139 The nine principles of the Global Compact are: 1) support the protection of interna-
tional human rights within their sphere of influence; 2) make sure their own corporations are
not complicit in human rights abuses; 3) uphold freedom of association and recognize the right
to collective bargaining; 4) uphold the elimination of forced labor; 5) uphold the effective
abolition of child labor; 6) uphold the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation; 7) support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 8) en-
courage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies; and 9) un-
dertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
supra note 138.
140 Id.
141 TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
OF SOCIAL POLICY, at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/guide/triparti.htm
(last visted Nov. 16, 2003).
142 Id.
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In response to concerns of corporate activity in national political
affairs, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") established Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in
1976.143 The Guidelines recognize the right of labor to organize and
bargain collectively (it requires employers to provide facilities and infor-
mation to union representatives, including financial and strategic infor-
mation), ban employment discrimination, require advance notice for
layoffs, and prevent management interference with the right to organ-
ize. 144 Though the Guidelines lack an enforcement mechanism, workers
and unions have successfully resolved disputes through the OECD. 1
45
Though the international community has failed to implement an ef-
fective code, momentum may be growing. International organizations,
including the World Trade Organization, have begun discussions on the
social and environmental impacts of their activities, and the World Bank
is developing projects that relate specifically to enviromental impact.' 46
If public pressure continues and political will is strong enough, using the
international community may be the way to develop guidelines for ac-
countable corporate behavior.
III. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS
Sustainability reports are the most comprehensive code of conduct.
Corporations or independent NGOs can develop these codes, and collab-
oration between the two often produces an effective code. Though vol-
untary, codes of conduct manifest a company's desire to act within the
law or to a higher standard of conduct. The basic problem is that the
codes are voluntary and often lack an external enforcement mechanism.
Sustainability reports are broad and vary, but they usually include factors
relating to transparency such as social, enviromental, and financial is-
sues. 147 The reports also address specific issues of a company's opera-
tions like resource use, philanthropy, worker conditions, and interaction
between the company and the surrounding community. 148 For the most
part, sustainability reports are not ground-breaking changes in behavior.
The reports have mainstream acceptance-major corporations have
143 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in
DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 243 (1983).
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Re-
sponsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1077
(2002); Ratner, supra note 88, at 537-38.
147 Richard Osborne, World Class Citizenship: Sustainability Reports Help Companies
Make Their Case, INDUS. WK., Oct. 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting Jon
Entine).
148 Id.
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adopted them and they have international recognition. Though sus-
tainability reports are gaining support in the U.S., stronger public pres-
sure in Europe leads European companies to be more willing to
implement these codes.' 49 Ninety-two of the Britain's top 100 compa-
nies publish information about their environmental or social policies. 50
Support is also strong in Japan, where 72 percent of the top 100 compa-
nies have sustainability reports. 15 1
A standardized sustainability report does not exist. But a standard-
ized report would be ineffective, as a company needs to tailor its report
to the important factors in its operation. Typically, a sustainability report
is comprised of three parts: a) a broad statement defining the relationship
between ethical conduct and the corporation's long-term goals; b) spe-
cific issues, which depend on what the company determines to be impor-
tant given the industry; and c) an enforcement and compliance
provision. 152 The code should also be appropriate to the industry and
corporate culture.' 53 The codes can also address internal conduct or the
conduct of an industry like the Rugmark code, which covers rug
production. ' 54
Four main international frameworks set the general standard for sus-
tainable reports: the U.N. Global Compact, the AccountAbility 1000, So-
cial Accountability 8000, and Sustainable Reporting Guidelines
developed by the Global Reporting Initiative. 155 The Guidelines are the
fastest growing of the four, and companies such as Procter & Gamble,
General Motors, and Nokia use them. 156 The Guidelines look at the so-
cial, economic, and environmental aspects of activities, products, and
services. 157 The Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility runs the
AccountAbility 1000.158 The AccountAbility 1000 helps businesses de-
149 See Gumbel, supra note 58, at A10. ("Across Europe, corporate social responsibility
and sustainable development are hot trends that have spawned a fast-growing industry of con-
sultants, accountants, and legal and p.r. specialists.").
150 Id.
151 See Julie Macken, Trick or Treat, AusrL. FtN. REV., Oct. 11, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News Library, AFREVW.
152 See Baker, supra note 7, at 423-24; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1641-45.
153 See Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 645. By tailoring a program to the particular
industry, the code will "cover legal issues and questions particular to that field of business."
Id. at 687.
154 See Mock, supra note 24, at 22-23. Rugmark began through a coalition of Indian
carpet industry representatives, the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude, and the Indo-
German Promotion Council. Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarr~re, supra note 36, at 674. The
Rugmark Foundation monitors the companies, which includes surprise visits by Foundation
inspectors. See id. Retailers can advertise the label to consumers. See id.
155 See Macken, supra note 151.
156 Id.
157 Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2002, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/2002/intro I a.asp.
158 AccoUNTABILrry, at http://www.accountability.org.uk (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
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fine their goals and targets, measures their progress against targets, gen-
erates audits, reports on performance, and has feedback mechanisms.
159
Social Accountability 8000 relates to labor standards and audits company
operations.160 The U.N. Global Compact covers human rights, labor, and
environmental issues. 161
Though a code ultimately may not shield a company from legal lia-
bility, a code signifies a corporation's "desire to cooperate" with the pub-
lic, the judiciary, and regulatory agencies.' 62 Companies should
incorporate legal obligations, whether formal or informal, into their
codes as a defense to possible legal action.' 63 Given the corporate struc-
ture, it is important that sustainability reports address internal decision-
makers and relations with contractors and suppliers. 164 The relationship
with contractors and suppliers is especially important when the contrac-
tors and suppliers use labor in developing countries, as these countries
may have lax standards or have limited enforcement capabilities.
A. COMPANIES WITH SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS
Currently, almost half of the 100 largest companies in the world
have adopted some form of a sustainability report.' 65 Brenda Pulley, the
vice-president of corporate and government relations of Alcan Inc., a
company that issued its first sustainability report in May 2002, notes that
the report "helps [to] quantify what the company is doing to accomplish
its sustainability goals. It really is our journey to sustainability. This is
part of being transparent."' 66 Companies usually publicize that they
have adopted a sustainability report-they issue press releases relating to
their reports and usually post the reports on their web sites.
159 Id.
160 The Social Accountability 8000 audits and certifies companies in their labor practice
in nine key areas: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, free association and collective
bargaining, discrimination discipline, working hours, compensation and management systems.
See SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000, at http://www.cepaa.org (last visited on Feb. 9, 2004).
161 See supra note 138-40 and accompanying text.
162 Baker, supra note 7, at 430.
163 See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1639-40.
164 See Ratner, supra note 57, at 532.
165 CSR Network Survey Focuses on Environmental and Social Reporting, Corporate Re-
porting, Bus. & ENV'T, July 1, 2003 [hereinafter Survey]. Over 25% of these companies had
stated their position on human rights. Id.
166 Osborne, supra note 147, at 1-2. Alcan's sustainability report has seven factors:
"[i]ntegrating economic, environmental and social considerations into business planning[;
rieducing the company's 'environmental footprint' [; olutlining challenges in managing indus-
trial and manufacturing processes[; d]emonstrating how its products enhance the quality of
life[; e]nsuring high standards of leadership[; s]trengthening relationships with stakeholders[;
diemonstrating integrity in day-to-day operations." Id.
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Ciba-Geigy recently developed an internal report specifically relat-
ing to the use of its pesticide product in a sub-Sahara African country. 167
The company's report, which targets pesticide use, promotes its social
responsibilities in a developing country. 68 Though Klaus Leisinger, the
director of third world relations at Ciba-Geigy, admits that the project is
below the company's average profit, the cost of adopting a code with
environmental protection beyond the host country's legally permissible
level represents a "corporate policy [that] allows for extending profit ex-
pectations over the longer term in third world projects."' 169 Leisinger
also states, "in recognizing their special responsibilities and working sen-
sitively in developing countries, multinationals can expect a smoother
and more sustained market development in the long run. In other words,
good ethics is good business."1 70
B. BENEFICIAL ELEMENTS
The two key beneficial elements of a code of conduct on company
operations involve its impact on the public and judiciary. In order for the
judiciary to be a persuasive factor in a corporation's decision to imple-
ment a code, a legal duty needs to exist. As discussed, companies have
legal duties like prohibitions against money laundering and corruption. 171
Social responsibility lawsuits pose a new type of legal duty. Some
would argue that legal norms are being extended from human rights con-
ventions and are emerging as norms to regulate corporate behavior. 72
1. Consumers and Investors
When a code of conduct is responsive to NGO criticism, the NGO is
less likely to publicize negative reports about company operations. Since
public relations influence consumer purchases, companies want to mini-
mize negative publicity. By incorporating business goals into a report, a
company can ensure investors that economic success is still the main
company goal. 173 Sustainability reports can also inform investors of cor-
167 See Leisinger, supra note 60.
168 The analysis involved creating an "organizational infrastructure-including reporting
lines and job descriptions-so that all of those involved, within and without Ciba-Geigy, knew
exactly what part they played in the project." Id. The company also "trained local farm work-
ers to use our product, oversaw the pesticide's safe application and began an educational pro-
ject that eventually reached 40,000 farmers." Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See supra footnotes 9-29 and accompanying text.
172 See Ratner, supra note 88.
173 See Baker, supra note 7, at 423 ("[T]he message conveyed is that the corporate of-
ficers have determined that, over the long-term, the interests of the shareholders will be en-
hanced-if their managers act ethically... [the] codes define the means [the companies] are
willing to employ without significantly altering the ultimate goals of the entity.").
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porate strategy. The SEC could make adoption of a report a prerequisite
to a company's listing on the stock exchange. 174 In 2000, Britain passed
legislation requiring pension funds to publish the percentage of their
portfolio that they make in socially responsible investments. 75
2. Potential Litigation Impact
Though a code of conduct is not legally binding, it signifies a com-
pany's intent to stay within legal bounds. 176 It can provide a defense that
a company acted within its code's regulations. 77 Nevertheless, codes
lack a legal framework in which to function, as courts have not fully
addressed the impact of codes in holding a corporation legally accounta-
ble for its actions. 178 Courts have used compliance codes as a factor to
determine the degree of liability. 179 Courts should give weight to com-
prehensive sustainability reports, because under traditional notions of
criminal liability, courts should not penalize companies that do not will-
fully commit wrongful acts. 180
Even if courts do not accept codes of conduct as a defense to or to
mitigate liability, the codes can reduce potential litigation.' 8' By inter-
acting with the NGOs that criticize the company, NGOs will be less
174 On November 4, 2003, in response to the recent financial scandals, the SEC approved
new rules for the NYSE and Nasdaq Stock Market that strengthen corporate governance stan-
dards. SEC, SEC Approves NYSE, NASDAQ Strengthening of Corporate Governance Stan-
dards for Listed Companies, at http:/www.sec.gov/new/press/2003-150.htm. SEC Chairman
William Donaldson said that the new rules "are at the core of a broad movement by our
markets to enhance the corporate governance practices of the companies traded on them....
Investors will recognize significant benefits from these actions today and long into the future."
Id. NYSE Section 303A(10) requires companies to adopt and disclose a code of business
conduct and ethics that includes compliance provisions for directors, officers, and employees.
SEC, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-
48748 (Nov. 4, 2003). SEC changes regarding corporate governance continue. On January
14, 2004, the SEC voted to propose three regulatory initiatives to protect mutual fund inves-
tors, which is in response to recent scandals in the mutual fund industry. SEC, SEC Proposes
New Investment Company Governance Requirements, New Investment Advisor Codes of Ethics
Requirements, and New Confirmation and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements, at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-5.html.
175 See Macken, supra note 151.
176 See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1634-35.
177 See id. at 1645.
178 See id. at 1644.
179 See Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 666 (noting that once a corporation violates the
law, prosecutors have discretion to determine if they will bring charges).
180 See id. at 677.
181 See id. at 662, 666-71 (noting that the codes do not protect a corporation from liabil-
ity, but rather offer rewards to corporations with comprehensive and enforced codes). Though
the codes of conduct do not guarantee that corporations will be protected "from prosecution,
the defense effectively discourages overzealous prosecutors from pursuing morally blameless
actors. In sum, legal recognition of a corporate compliance defense will result in long-term
savings both for the corporations that receive the benefit of the defense and for the law en-
forcement bodies responsible for corporate oversight." Id. at 684.
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likely to file misconduct claims if a code of conduct is acceptable to their
environmental or social demands. Corporations may also avoid litigation
from regulatory agencies. The Department of Justice considers self-reg-
ulation when it determines whether it will prosecute. 182 Ultimately, a
company cannot avoid litigation by self-regulation. 83 But developing
and enforcing sustainability reports is a way to detect potential problem-
sand a way to correct conduct accordingly.
As more companies adopt codes of conduct and as the number of
lawsuits filed against companies increases, judicial guidelines will define
more clearly the legal impact of a code of conduct. The NGO Interna-
tional Labor Rights Fund filed a federal suit in 2001 against Exx-
onMobil, alleging ATCA violations for Exxon Mobils activities in
Indonesia. 184 In June 2002, ExxonMobil adopted the Voluntary Princi-
ples on Security and Human Rights program, which the State Depart-
ment developed in conjunction with the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, multina-
tional oil and mining companies, and human rights organizations includ-
ing Human Rights Watch. Though the alleged abuses occurred before
ExxonMobil adopted a code of conduct relating to human rights issues, it
will be interesting to see what, if any, the adoption will have on the
court's analysis.
C. EXTERNAL REVIEW
Since a code of conduct is a private creation, enforcement capability
is limited to a company's willingness to enforce its behavior standards.
Conduct does not always follow statements, which makes review of ac-
tivities key to ensure compliance. A code's impact beyond being a pub-
lic relations ploy depends upon the strength of enforcement and
oversight. A staff that oversees the code can ensure that the company
follows and will adapt the code to future circumstances. 185 But indepen-
dent external review that monitors compliance is the best way to ensure
that a code is effective and to ensure transparency.1 86 Like the Sullivan
182 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Principles of the
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) (noting factors that a prosecu-
tor will look at to determine "whether the corporation has adopted and implemented a truly
effective compliance program that, when consistent with other federal law enforcement poli-
cies, may result in a decision to charge only the corporation's employees and agents").
183 See Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 679.
184 The suit was filed on June 11, 2001. Terry Collingsworth, Lawsuit Says Exxon Aided
Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMEs, (June 21, 2001), at Cl.
185 See Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 681 (noting that devoting staff to ensure compli-
ance with codes is an additional expense).
186 Between 2000 and 2003, the percentage of 100 largest corporations that had indepen-
dent assessment of their sustainability reports increased from 8 to 18%. Survey, supra note
165 (noting that 76% of companies with independent assessment are European).
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Principles, companies can establish an independent external review to
audit compliance.187 This would ideally be through a certified accredit-
ing NGO. Today, Unocal's web site states that its impact in foreign
countries allows it to "introduce modem values and concepts."'188 Fur-
ther, "Unocal is able to raise concerns about human rights issues and
privately present [its] views."'189 But a statement or report by itself does
not provide information on whether a company is abiding by its state-
ments and whether its actions actually have a positive impact.' 90 The
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants' proposal for corporate
governance reform includes an independent audit mechanism. 19'
An independent certification program that targets a specific industry
and independently reviews a company's policies and activities is the best
way to ensure that a company maintains its sustainable promises. The
Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") is a certified accrediting group that
acts as an external mechanism to ensure that companies harvest timber at
a sustainable level. 192 Home Depot changed its policy on old-growth
timber after intense NGO pressure; in 1999, Home Depot initiated a for-
est policy in collaboration with the FSC. 193 Though NGOs recognized
that Home Depot was working to meet their demands for more sustaina-
ble timber harvesting projects, the groups were not satisfied. 94 In re-
sponse, Home Depot increased the amount of FSC certified products,
issued reports on its progress, and introduced a new sustainable policy in
January 2003.195 Market forces can also challenge a company to change
its policies. Home Depot also faced pressure from its biggest competitor,
Lowe's Co. Lowe's decisions on its forestry practices and promise to
187 See Mock, supra note 24, at 24.
188 Unocal Corporation, Business and Human Rights, at http://www.unocal.com/responsi-
bility/humanrights/hr4.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
189 Id.
190 See Gumbel, supra note 58 ("The big question ... is whether all this marks a tangible
change in the way corporations behave or whether it's simply 'greenwash,' an elaborate public
relations exercise designed to make firms appear more sensitive than they really are.").
191 See Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Audit Committee Reform a Top
Priority for Companies, says ACCA (July 15, 2002), at http://www.accaglobal.com/news/re-
leases/591115 (stating that the independent audit committee should "recommend to sharehold-
ers the appointment of auditors who have served for more than a defined period (five to seven
years), publish annual reviews of the independence of the external auditors, [and] ... publish
annual reports of the Committee's work, including risk management and internal control
reviews").
192 Karen Jacobs, Home Depot Adopts New Wood Purchasing Policy, REUTERS NEWSER-
viCE, Jan. 2, 2003, available at http://www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=61 1; see generally
Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BuFF. ENVT'L L.J.
211 (2003).
t93 Jacobs, supra note 192; The Home Depot Inc., Wood Purchasing Policy, available at
http://www.homedepot.com.
194 Harry R. Weber, Home Depot Retooling Timber Policy, but Criticisms Still Persist,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 2, 2003.
195 See Jacobs, supra note 192; Weber, supra note.
20041
530 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:503
phase out timber purchase from endangered forests placed pressure on
Home Depot to comply with the FSC's demands.196
D. PROBLEMS
Since the codes are privately enforced and agencies or statutes do
not regulate them, their influence and potential effect will inevitably
vary. Companies often develop the codes internally, which raises issues
of what aspects the code will cover and if the code will address problem-
atic areas. The codes should cover all aspects of operations and extend
to contractors and suppliers, regardless of their location. Moreover, the
lack of legal enforcement of codes causes some critics to consider them
mere public relation ploys with little practical effect. 197 Though Uno-
cal's web site now boasts its beneficial social and environmental behav-
ior, 198 one cannot tell by merely reading the statements if the company
has in fact changed its operations and is more accountable.
Critics also cite the costs to develop and implement the reports as
another downfall. But the benefits may outweigh the costs if the reports
influence consumer purchases and investment decisions. Companies
need to know the implications of adopting a code of conduct, specifically
with regard to profit and its ability to mitigate litigation. Though sus-
tainability reports represent a desire to do well, they need to be beneficial
to company operations.
Though companies often develop codes in response to NGO pres-
sure, NGO pressure may not be justified. NGOs may not represent pub-
lic, especially consumer, opinion about how a company should operate.
NGOs may also not give an accurate description of a company's policies
or operations. This is part of another problem-to whom are NGOs ac-
countable? Negative publicity may not reflect reality or may ignore ben-
eficial aspects of a company's operations. Lawsuits are costly and time-
consuming, and companies may settle lawsuits to avoid these expenses,
which in turn can increase the number of lawsuits in the future.
CONCLUSION
The potential for socially accountable corporate behavior is entering
a new era as major corporations have begun to develop their own codes
of conduct, often in collaboration with NGOs. Codes of conduct are a
"natural result of legal and social pressures for the proper control and
supervision of corporate agents. By adopting programs for preventing,
196 See Jacobs, supra note 192; Associated Press, supra note 192.
197 See Baker, supra note 7, at 417; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 1560 ("Adopt-
ing a code of conduct is tantamount to a commitment to engage in corporate self-regulation.").
198 Unocal, Unocal Corporate Responsibility, available at http://www.unocal.comlre-
sponsibility/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
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detecting, and reporting wrongdoing, corporations [recognize] the re-
sponsibilities inherent in their position in society."' 199 But more work is
necessary to ensure the goal of accountability. The multiple aspects of
the problem along with the international realm of actors create difficul-
ties in developing a comprehensive international regulatory and enforce-
ment mechanism. Accountability, however, is possible. Once an
international consensus establishes general guidelines of acceptable cor-
porate behavior, the next step is to target specific industries and compa-
nies to pressure them to enact their own codes of conduct to monitor
behavior.2 00 Many companies have already implemented codes of con-
duct in response to such pressure. Continuing this process is both desira-
ble and achievable. Sustainability reports are simply a more
comprehensive code of conduct that addresses all aspects of a company's
operations.
Companies need a reason to develop an effective code and to ensure
that the code remains effective in addressing all areas of concern. Sus-
tainability reports need to produce a positive benefit to the company,
which could be through limiting liability or the granting of a government
benefit. "Companies violating their duties could face sanctions ranging
from mere publication of a list of companies whose practices appear to
fall below acceptable standards, to loss of particular benefits, such as
preferential loans for overseas investments or permits for the import or
export of commodities, up to criminal fines."'20  Governments could also
develop a regulatory scheme to comprehensively monitor companies in-
corporated in their country.
Labeling of products is an offshoot from codes of conduct. Label-
ing can increase consumer awareness about a company policy. A label
can also target a specific segment of consumers that want to buy socially
responsible products and are willing to pay a higher price for such prod-
ucts.2 0 2 Industry groups, often cooperating with NGOs, can certify prod-
ucts that are of a certain standard (like the Rugmark label).20 3
199 Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 690-91 (finding that legal recognition of codes of
conduct is a necessary growth of the law in order to recognize corporations that are choosing
to stay within legal bounds).
200 On June 24, 2004, the U.N. is holding a summit meeting on the Global Compact at its
headquarters to address corporate responsibility issues and how it can be more effective in the
future. Annan 2004, supra note 6. Annan states that to "tackle root problems," the summit
will need to address questions such as "can corporate performance help to overcome govern-
ment deficiencies[;] how can corporate performance have a positive influence on government
policy-making[;] how can we scale up promising solutions and achieve greater systemic
change[;] how can we bring the financial community on board so that they recognize that a
commitment to positive change can reduce risks[;] how do we need to change the mission and
operations of the Compact to make us more effective in our undertaking." Id.
201 Pyrich & Walsh, supra note 2, at 534.
202 See supra footnotes 41-43 and accompanying text.
203 See Ratner, supra note 88, at 531-32.
2004]
532 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:503
Both companies and governments have a role to play given political
and economic interests. 204 As precedent from judicial recognition of
codes develops, it can help establish clearer guidelines on how to limit
corporate liability. Regardless of whether a company develops a code of
conduct, the code will only be as effective as its initial aim and its en-
forcement. Though voluntary, sustainability reports signify a positive re-
action and a way to develop transparency, thereby helping to prevent
corporate scandals and ensuring better business practices globally.
20 5
204 See id. at 545.
205 In his address at the 1999 World Economic Forum in Switzerland, the U.N. Secretary
General noted to his audience, "Many of you are big investors, employers and producers in
dozens of different countries across the world. That power brings with it great opportunities-
and great responsibilities. You can uphold human fights and decent labour and environmental
standards directly, by your own conduct of your own business. ... You can make sure that in
your own corporate practices you uphold and respect human fights; and that you are not your-
selves complicit in human rights abuses." Annan 1999, supra note 124.
